Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices

By Xavier Giroud, Holger M. Mueller. 2008

1,142 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bf261092784d36f171f44ce7e4c4661a9576d61c

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Citations in the corpus

Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Acquisition Outcomes (2011, neutral): “Giroud and Mueller (2011) argue that product market competition is a more powerful discipline tool than internal governance mechanisms.”
The value of a firm’s engagement in ESG practices: Are we looking at the right side? (2021, background): “Finally, rivalry provides additional incentives to improve a firm’s efficiency and total value (Giroud and Mueller, 2011).”
An Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Performance with Moderating Effects of CEO Power and Ownership Structure: A Case Study of the Manufacturing Sector of Pakistan (2019, neutral): “There are different channels for corporate governance, as reported by X Giroud and HM Mueller [105].”
CEO Duality, Agency Costs, and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency (2019, neutral): “HHI is computed for each of the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries based on the firms in the Compustat universe following the estimation scheme in Giroud and Mueller (2011).”
Product market power, industry structure, and corporate earnings management (2013, background): “Recent empirical evidence seems to support the idea that product market competition provides incentives for managers to be more closely aligned with shareholders' interests (e.g. Giroud and Mueller, 2011).”
The Impact of Working Capital Management on Firm Profitability: Empirical Evidence from the Polish Listed Firms (2020, background): “Giroud and Mueller (2011) take into account market competition and highlight, that, weak corporate governance lowers firm value in non-competitive industries.”
Competition and the Cost of Debt (2012, neutral): “Recent research shows that corporate governance, measured by the G-Index, relates to competition and to the pricing of equity and debt (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Giroud and Mueller, 2010, 2011; Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam, 2009).”
Financial Statement Comparability and Expected Crash Risk (2016, positive): “Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Giroud and Mueller, 2010, 2011), product market competition is measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI).”
Corporate Boards and Ownership Structure as Antecedents of Corporate Governance Disclosure in Saudi Arabian Publicly Listed Corporations (2018, background): “Keywords: corporate governance, board and ownership structures, voluntary disclosure regime, multitheory, Saudi Arabia”
Product market competition and corporate investment: Evidence from China (2015, background): “, Tirole (1988), Juan and Becerra (2008), and Giroud and Mueller (2011)).”
Audit Quality and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Microfinance Industry (2012, neutral): “We propose that fiercer competition reduces managerial slack and increases a firm’s need for control (cf. Giroud and Mueller, 2011).”
Corporate governance, financial management decisions and firm performance: Evidence from the maritime industry (2014, background): “Research output on the impact of corporate governance on firm policies and performance has been extremely prolific in the general cross section of industrial firms (see, among others, Gompers et al., 2003; Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Brown et al., 2011).”
Product market competition and debt choice (2018, background): “Indeed, recent empirical studies shed lights on the substitution effect between the disciplinary power of competition and the quality of corporate governance, such as the market for corporate control (Giroud and Mueller, 2010) and the internal governance mechanisms (Giroud and Mueller, 2011; Chaochh”
CFOs versus CEOs: Equity Incentives and Crashes (2011, positive): “Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011) find that the incentive provided by a firm’s corporate governance system matters only if the firm operates in non-competitive industries.”