Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
By J. Bartholdi, James B. Orlin. 2015
385 citations recorded by the source corpus.
We give evidence that Single Tranferable Vote (STV) is computationally resistant to manipulation: It is NP-complete to determine whether there exists a (possibly insincere) preference that will elect a favored candiate, even in an election for a single seat. Thus strategic voting under STV is qualitatively more difficult than under other commonly-used voting schemes. Furthermore, this resistance to manipulation is inherent to STV and does not depend on hopeful extraneous assumptions like the presumed difficulty of learning the preferences of the other voters. We also prove that it is NP-complete to recognize when an STV election violates monotonicity. This suggests that non-monotonicity in STV elections might be perceived as less threatening since it is in effect “hidden” and hard to exploit for strategic advantage.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bf1722ed8c19f79a0d2588fc5b4dc8dbf5501037
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Citations in the corpus
- When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient (2012, methodology): “This gives a very general reply to a literature that seeks ways around the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem by devising voting mechanisms that are computationally difficult, but not impossible, to strategically manipulate (e.g. Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick (1989), Bartholdi and Orlin (1991)).”
- A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice (2007, background): “For instance, Single Transferable Vote is NP-hard to manipulate by single agents [8].”