Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in Professional Team Sports
By S. Késenne. 2000
314 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bf05f314e68c529862e8ef3533e26eef3442d689
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- C. Breuer
- Stefan Szymanski
- Marc Rohde
- R. Fort
- Pedro Garcia‐del‐Barrio
- J. Quirk
- T. Pawlowski
- Arnd Hovemann
In Gender Studies
- C. Breuer
- Marc Rohde
- Stefan Szymanski
- R. Fort
- J. Quirk
- Pedro Garcia‐del‐Barrio
- T. Pawlowski
- Arnd Hovemann
In Sociology and Political Science
- C. Breuer
- Marc Rohde
- Stefan Szymanski
- R. Fort
- J. Quirk
- Pedro Garcia‐del‐Barrio
- T. Pawlowski
- Arnd Hovemann
Citations in the corpus
- Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports (2004, unknown): “12 Several writers have identified exceptions to this rule, notably Atkinson et al (1988), Marburger (1997), Hoehn and Szymanski (1999) and Késenne (2000).”
- The market for football club investors: a review of theory and empirical evidence from professional European football (2017, background): “While English football clubs may be utility or profit maximizers, most researchers agree that continental European football clubs are closest to win maximizers (Garcia-del-Barrio & Szymanski, 2009; Késenne, 2000).”
- Goal! Profit Maximization Versus Win Maximization in Soccer (2009, background): “However, following from the earlier work of Sloane (1971), Kesenne (1996; 2000) has argued that, in the world of European soccer, clubs can be treated as win maximizers (subject to a profit constraint) rather than profit maximizers, leading to different conclusions about competitive restraints.”
- Top Clubs’ Performance and the Competitive Situation in European Domestic Football Competitions (2010, background): “In addition, CB depends on the distribution of player talent among clubs (Késenne, 2000).”
- Inelastic sports pricing (2004, background): “In the European context, see Kesenne (1996, 2000) and in the general context of owner objectives, see Fort and Quirk (2002).”
- Competitive balance versus competitive intensity before a match: is one of these two concepts more relevant in explaining attendance? The case of the French football Ligue 1 over the period 2008–2011 (2013, background): “In professional sports economics, the concept of competitive balance is currently well documented (Kesenne, 2000; Szymanski, 2001, 2003; Humphreys, 2002; Zimbalist, 2002; Fort and Maxcy, 2003; Groot, 2008; Lee, 2010).”
- Owner Objectives and Competitive Balance (2004, background): “For example, quality held constant, gate sharing has no impact on the talent choices of PM owners (Fort & Quirk, 1995; Vrooman, 1995; for quality changes associated with gate sharing, see Marburger, 1997; Kesenne, 2000).”
- The Determinants of Football Match Attendance Revisited (2002, background): “Finally, we wish to comment on the importance of home and team quality variables because of the implications on the effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance when the absolute value of a game affects attendance (Késenne, 2000).”