Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
By Peter Carruthers. 2000
157 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bdb8bb58b2a7c5f58c1808221f4b2a64edd3973d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
- Manolo Martínez
- Peter Carruthers
- K. Stanovich
- Jonathan Evans
- Gary Lupyan
- Keith Frankish
- Charles Fernyhough
In Philosophy
- Manolo Martínez
- Peter Carruthers
- Elisabeth Pacherie
- John A. Bargh
- Henk Aarts
- David F. Feldon
- Thomas K. Metzinger
- Michael Madary
Citations in the corpus
- Imperative content and the painfulness of pain (2011, background): “Representationalism, under some guise or other, is one of the most popular approaches to a naturalistic treatment of phenomenal consciousness (to name but a few recent discussions, cf. Carruthers 2000; Dretske 2003; Van Gulick 2004; Rosenthal 2005; Tye 2000).”
- The cognitive functions of language (2002, background): “And on the sort of higher-order theory of consciousness which I favor (Carruthers 2000), perceptual and imagistic states get to be phenomenally conscious by virtue of their availability to the higher-order thoughts generated by the theory of mind system (i.e., thoughts about those perceptual and…”