Ill-defined property rights in collective action: the case of US agricultural cooperatives

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A Life Cycle Explanation of Cooperative Longevity (2018, background): “Collective action may also be constrained by internal free riders: members whose individual benefit is not proportional to their resource contribution [65].”
Opportunity Discovery, Entrepreneurial Action, and Economic Organization (2008, background): “The Austrian theory of capital, interpreted in the “attributes” framework described above, provides a useful bridge between the Knightian theory of entrepreneurship and the theory of economic organiza- 18 See Cook and Iliopoulos (2000) and Cook and Chaddad (2004) for details.”
Agroindustrialization of the global agrifood economy: bridging development economics and agribusiness research. (2000, background): “Cook and Iliopoulos (2000) provide an example of agribusiness management applied research focusing on the transaction costs of equity capital acquisition in agricultural cooperatives.”
Why are cooperatives important in agriculture? An organizational economics perspective (2007, background): “These incentive problems are evidently characteristic of cooperatives regardless of their sectoral field, yet Cook (1995, also Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000) emphasized that they are particularly pronounced among many US agricultural cooperatives, thereby causing transformations in the cooperatives’…”