Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification

By J. Ketland. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2004

113 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bcbfe90b4a2b6bc56202e5971bac0dc520fc04dd

How researchers see this paper

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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

1. Steven French
2. Ioannis Votsis
3. Roman Frigg
4. O. Pooley

In History and Philosophy of Science

1. O. Pooley
2. Ioannis Votsis
3. Roman Frigg
4. Steven French

In Philosophy

1. Steven French
2. Ioannis Votsis
3. Roman Frigg
4. O. Pooley

Citations in the corpus

• Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask (2011, methodology): “For a formal proof see Ketland (2004, 294–5), although the result should be intuitively obvious.”
• Points, particles, and structural realism (2005, background): “1For a careful defence of the claim that the truth of a theory’s Ramsey sentence is equivalent to the combination of its empirical adequacy together with a cardinality constraint, see Ketland (2004). 2¿e phenomenalistic strain in Zahar’s philosophy might suggest that he is committed to (1).”
• VI* STRUCTURE AS A WEAPON OF THE REALIST' (2006, background): “However, it has been argued that for certain modeltheoretic constructions, if the Ramsey sentence is empirically adequate and it gets the number of unobservable elements in the domain right, then it must be true and structuralism is trivialized (Ketland 2004).”