Bank Regulation and Supervision in 180 Countries from 1999 to 2011

By James R. Barth, G. Caprio, Ross Levine. 2013

863 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bb926a1f73a8b05ce50c9239a7ef4748f38559a9

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Citations in the corpus

National culture and bank risk-taking (2017, background): “Barth et al. (2013) also highlight the degree of transparency in financial statements as one of the factors linked to bank risk, whereas Houston et al. (2010) show that information sharing among creditors has significant effect in increasing bank profitability and lowering risk.”
Does institutional quality condition the effect of bank regulations and supervision on bank stability? Evidence from emerging and developing economies (2018, methodology): “4 The dataset on bank regulation and supervision of Barth et al. (2013) represents the most diligent effort to date in order to standardise and render comparable, both across time and across countries, indices of bank regulation and supervision.”
Cross-Border Prudential Policy Spillovers: How Much? How Important? Evidence from the International Banking Research Network (2016, methodology): “Moreover, teams examine spillovers using an index PruC that captures the change of any regulation and which is conceptually more comparable to the approach in studies that utilized the lower-frequency (three-year survey) data of Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013).”
Monetary policy and bank lending in a low interest rate environment: Diminishing effectiveness? (2017, background): “A 1 percentage point reduction in the interest rate boosts lending by 1.5% in the short run (within a year) and by 1.7% in the long-run.13 These effects are very similar to those reported in other studies (eg Gambacorta and Marqués-Ibáñez (2011), who analyse a sample of more than 1,000 banks from th”
Financial Repression in the European Sovereign Debt Crisis (2017, neutral): “The first measure is from the country-level survey conducted by the World Bank (see Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2013, whose research team was instrumental to the design of this survey).”
Banking stability determinants in Africa (2018, neutral): “Incomplete regulation refers to a weak regulatory framework which gives rise to the need for regulatory reforms (US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011), while ineffective supervision involves using weak supervisory tools, and the need to adopt the most effective supervisory tools and styles (”
Economic uncertainty and bank risk: Evidence from emerging economies (2020, positive): “Using the survey data provided by Barth et al. (2004, 2008, 2013) and following the methodology suggested by Barth et al.(2004), we build country-level time-series indices for each of the above four regulatory dimensions for each emerging economy in our sample.27 A higher score in these indices…”
Corruption and bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging economies (2015, neutral): “Barth et al (2004, 2008, 2013) and authors’ own calculation 11.656 1.788 12 - .024 Private Index of the private monitor strength.”
Regulatory arbitrage in action: evidence from banking flows and macroprudential policy (2015, background): “Barth et al. (2013) constitutes probably the best attempt.”