Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis

By J. Farinha. 2003

376 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bb434b5b7919d46dc24adaf70cd557c97e259ecc

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Citations in the corpus

Company Dividends and Ownership Structure: Evidence from UK Panel Data (2006, positive): “…link between dividends payouts and corporate earnings such that the payout ratio is lower than would be the case for a corresponding widely held rm. Farinha (2003) uses a cross-section of more than 600 rms at two points in time and nds evidence of a U-shaped relationship between dividends and…”
Do Family Firms Use Dividend Policy as a Governance Mechanism? Evidence from the Euro Zone (2012, background): “In fact, prior studies support a substitution effect between corporate ownership structure and dividends from different perspectives (Farinha, 2003; Moh’d, Perry, & Rimbey, 1995).”
Patterns in Payout Policy and Payout Channel Choice of UK Firms in the 1990s (2005, neutral): “2 Bond et al. (1996), Lasfer (1996), Bell and Jenkinson (2002), Short et al. (2002), Farinha (2003), Lasfer and Zenonos (2003), Correia da Silva et al. (2004) analyze dividend policy only, while Rau and Vermaelen (2002) and Oswald and Young (2004) focus exclusively on factors determining repurchase…”
Board composition, ownership structure and dividend policies in an emerging market: Further evidence from CASE 50 (2008, background): “However, it is possible that institutions may influence higher dividend payouts by a company, to enhance managerial monitoring by external capital markets, especially if they believe their own direct monitoring efforts to be insufficient or too costly (Farinha, 2003).”
Firm Performance: Do Non-Executive Directors Have a Mind of Their Own? Evidence from Uk Panel Data (2007, neutral): “This result is partly in line with findings by Farinha (2003) who shows an increase in dividend payments for UK firms, when managers are entrenched.”
The association between dividend payout and outside directorships (2009, positive): “Farinha (2003) explains these mixed results by showing evidence that dividend payouts are JAAR 10,1 10 negatively related to ’beneficial’ insider ownership below an entrenchment level of ownership, while they are positively related above that level.”
Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance (2008, positive): “dividends (Farinha, 2003) can complement (Zwiebel, 1996) or substitute (Jensen, 1986) each other in order to constrain managerial discretion and prevent entrenchment.”
Do Managerial Motives Impact Dividend Decisions in REITs? (2006, background): “This is consistent with Farinha’s conjecture that the U-shaped relation between dividend policy and insider holdings may not hold for smaller firms. (pp. 1205, Farinha (2003)).”
Ownership concentration and dividend policy in Japan (2011, result): “Farinha (2003) also reports a negative effect on the dividend payout of UK firms, although the results appear to be sensitive to model specification.”
Does corporate governance explain dividend policy in Sub‐Saharan Africa? (2013, background): “In a study by Fenn and Liang (2001), investigating how managerial stock incentives affect dividend payout policy, they found that managerial stock incentives mitigate the agency costs for firms with excess cash flow problems.”