Robust defenses for cross-site request forgery

By Adam Barth, Collin Jackson, John C. Mitchell. Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2008

499 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Insights into User Behavior in Dealing with Internet Attacks (2012, background): “We also show that trick banners that are common in file sharing websites and shortened URLs have high success rates of deceiving non-technical users, thus posing a severe security risk.”
Edge Computing Security: State of the Art and Challenges (2019, background): “[122] showed that these two mechanisms can fail if being adapted to new variations of CSRF, e.”
Third-Party Web Tracking: Policy and Technology (2012, background): “I. INTRODUCTION The web has evolved to facilitate development and delivery of webpages composed of content from multiple websites.”
Cross-Site Request Forgeries : Exploitation and Prevention (2008, background): “The solution below does not protect against active network attackers (see [17] for more details).”
QUIRE: Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone Operating Systems (2011, methodology): “…the new HTTP headers, with their security-relevant contextual information, would not be accessible to or forgeable by the applications making RPCs. (This is analogous to the HTTP origin header [2], generated by modern web browsers, but carries more detailed contextual information from the caller.)”