Circuit ORAM: On Tightness of the Goldreich-Ostrovsky Lower Bound

By Xiao Shaun Wang, T-H. Hubert Chan, Elaine Shi. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2015

315 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computational Theory and Mathematics, Electrical and Electronic Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b9d291384ef28974e7cd07943aa004aad394cbd2

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Citations in the corpus

Path ORAM: an extremely simple oblivious RAM protocol (2012, unknown): “To achieve 2 − λ failure probability, their scheme achieves O ( λ (log N ) 2 / (log λ log χ )) blocks bandwidth cost, for block size B = χ · log N bits.”
GraphSC: Parallel Secure Computation Made Easy (2015, background): “Section IV and Figure 5 later in the paper will elaborate on the details of our models and terminology.”
Solidus: Confidential Distributed Ledger Transactions via PVORM (2017, methodology): “To make updates publicly veriﬁable, a bank ﬁrst moves the desired account to a deterministic ﬁxed block by swapping that position with each block along the Circuit ORAM access path.”
A Pragmatic Introduction to Secure Multi-Party Computation (2019, background): “A few examples include privacy-preserving network security monitoring (Burkhart et al., 2010), privacy-preserving genomics (Wang et al., 2015a; Jagadeesh et al., 2017), private stable matching (Doerner et al., 2016), contact discovery (Li et al., 2013; De Cristofaro et al., 2013), ad conversion…”
MU-ORAM: Dealing with Stealthy Privacy Attacks in Multi-User Data Outsourcing Services (2016, background): “Derived from these constructions, numerous variants [3–6, 9, 10, 12, 24, 26–28, 30–32, 35, 38, 39, 44] have been proposed to further improve the performance, especially the communication performance.”
SGX-LKL: Securing the Host OS Interface for Trusted Execution (2019, background): “omise the disk layout before application execution, hiding the initial block mapping; and (ii) shufﬂe blocks by changing the mapping in a manner opaque to the adversary. Existing oblivious RAM (ORAM) [30,40,62,92,93,109] constructions can be used to hide block accesses. LKL’s page cache is well-suit”