Central Bank Transparency
By P. Geraats. 2002
724 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b91b6d499cec32737f750bc3e9029b0e0086737f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Marcel Fratzscher
- C. Walsh
- Michael Ehrmann
- P. Geraats
- Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
- Hyun Song Shin
- Stephen Morris
- Stefano Eusepi
In Finance
- Marcel Fratzscher
- Michael Ehrmann
- P. Geraats
- C. Walsh
- Hyun Song Shin
- Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
- Paolo Mauro
- Stephen Morris
Citations in the corpus
- Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice (2006, methodology): “In particular, anticipating the disclosure of a particular type of information, the central bank and/or 1They are similar to the effects described by Geraats (2002), except for being more general and sophisticated.”
- Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination (2006, background): “Geraats (2002) gives an overview with several examples of welfare reducing information in a Barro-Gordon framework.”
- Communication and Monetary Policy (2002, neutral): “Geraats (2002), Winkler (2000) and Jensen (2002) are some recent discussions that attempt to classify the various dimensions of the problem.”
- Optimal Economic Transparency (2012, background): “Geraats (2002) identifies five different forms of transparency: political, procedural, economic, policy, and operational.”
- Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions - Past Present and Future (2008, background): “24 See Cukierman (2001) for a full discussion. 25 Geraats (2002) presents a survey.”
- Review of Monetary Policy in South Africa Since 1994 (2007, background): “Theoretical and empirical evidence on central bank transparency has recently been surveyed by Geraats (2002).”
- Speaking to the people? Money, trust, and central bank legitimacy in the age of quantitative easing (2016, background): “…the challenge for monetary policymakers consists of managing expectations, and the solution comes in the form of central bank transparency (Geraats, 2002).1 However, central banks do not only speak ‘to the markets’ but also ‘to the people’ (Schmidt, 2014) – that is, to a general public…”
- Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices (2006, background): “Goodhart (2004) reports ndings for the Bank of England's forecast performance, and reports a similar lack of predictive power for longer term forecasts, but Goodhart points out that when the central bank acts on the forecasts themselves, the lack of correlation between the initial forecast and the n”
- European Monetary Union: the dark sides of a major success (2006, background): “Early evidence (e.g. Geraats, 2002; Gerlach-Kristen, 2005) indicates that transparency raises effectiveness.”
- Communication and Decision-Making by Central Bank Committees: Different Strategies, Same Effectiveness? (2005, positive): “Guthrie and Wright (2000) find that communication has been used in a systematic and highly effective way for controlling short-term rates by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.”