These aren't the droids you're looking for: retrofitting android to protect data from imperious applications

By Peter Hornyack, Seungyeop Han, Jaeyeon Jung, Stuart E. Schechter, David Wetherall. Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2011

717 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Sociology and Political Science, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b8d88ea73e69f4a6dfb6df79e685165f09244fa6

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Citations in the corpus

Hey, You, Get Off of My Market: Detecting Malicious Apps in Official and Alternative Android Markets (2012, background): “Apex [47], MockDroid [28], TISSA [54] and AppFence [42] revise the current Android framework or runtime to better provide fine-grained controls of resources accessed by third-party untrusted apps.”
TaintDroid (2010, background): “2011], and AppFence [Hornyack et al. 2011] replace sensitive information with fake values.”
Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment (2012, methodology): “We use a vulnerability described in [28] to infiltrate the ME environment during runtime.”
Towards Taming Privilege-Escalation Attacks on Android (2012, background): “AppFence [27] builds upon and extends the current TaintDroid framework by allowing users to transparently enable privacy control mechanisms.”
Expectation and purpose: understanding users' mental models of mobile app privacy through crowdsourcing (2012, methodology): “MockDroid [6], TISSA [39] and AppFence [22] substitute fake information into API calls made by apps, such that apps could still function but with zero disclosure of users' private information.”
Aurasium: Practical Policy Enforcement for Android Applications (2012, methodology): “Aurasium’s architecture and design allow us to implement many of the already-proposed policies such as dynamically constraining permissions [33], or setting up default dummy IMEI and IMSI numbers as well as phone numbers, as in [27].”
Systematic Detection of Capability Leaks in Stock Android Smartphones (2012, background): “AppFence [23] couples such a privacy mode with taint tracking to allow for expressive policies.”
ContexloT: Towards Providing Contextual Integrity to Appified IoT Platforms (2017, background): “AppFence [41] Protecting private data from being exfiltrated X X”
AppsPlayground: automatic security analysis of smartphone applications (2013, background): “istic behavior of applications which has been witnessed by others also [9].”
Privacy in the Internet of Things: threats and challenges (2014, background): “Extensive privacy research has been conducted focussing mostly on location-based services [52, 53, 54], detection of privacy breaches [55, 56] and privacy aware architectures for participatory sensing [57, 58].”
Modeling Users' Mobile App Privacy Preferences: Restoring Usability in a Sea of Permission Settings (2014, background): “This was quickly followed by research exploring solutions that offered users finer grain control over the use of these APIs [8-10].”
WHYPER: Towards Automating Risk Assessment of Mobile Applications (2013, background): “Previous work has looked at permissions [2–5], code [6–10], and runtime behavior [11–13].”
Your Location has been Shared 5,398 Times!: A Field Study on Mobile App Privacy Nudging (2015, background): “AppFence [19] uses taint tracking [12] to provide shadow data to untrusted apps and to block data from leaving the device.”
Effective inter-component communication mapping in Android with Epicc: an essential step towards holistic security analysis (2013, methodology): “used in the AppFence system [22], which actively prevents sensitive data exfiltration from mobile devices.”
CHEX: statically vetting Android apps for component hijacking vulnerabilities (2012, background): “A different but related topic is data leakage detection [15, 24], which looks for individual data flows that indicate sensitive data being propagated out of certain containment scope.”
MOSES: Supporting and Enforcing Security Profiles on Smartphones (2014, methodology): “By using Taintdroid’s tainting capability, AppFence [18] provides additional mechanisms to shadow sensitive data and to block unauthorised leakage of data via network.”
EnCore: private, context-based communication for mobile social apps (2014, background): “Location privacy Several works investigate location privacy for mobile devices [34, 38, 53, 32, 35].”
Dissecting Android Malware: Characterization and Evolution (2012, background): “Specifically, Apex [46], MockDroid [47], TISSA [48] and AppFence [49] extend the current Android framework to provide find-grained controls of system resources accessed by untrusted third-party apps.”