Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare

By Manuel Amador, Pierre-Olivier Weill. Journal of Political Economy, 2010

260 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b79568f91d04eac01ddfde312d3a2159152ccfcd

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Citations in the corpus

Incentives for Information Production in Markets where Prices Affect Real Investment (2016, unknown): “Using (2) and (3), we can see that the expression in the brackets in the second line is 0.”
Good disclosure, bad disclosure (2019, methodology): “The mechanism in our paper is related to that in Amador and Weill (2010). They construct a monetary model and show that releasing public information about monetary and/or productivity shocks can reduce welfare through reducing the informational effi ciency of the good price system, which relates to ”
Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination (2016, unknown): “For examples of the first type, we refer the reader to Amador and Weill (2012), Angeletos and Pavan (2009), Laffont (1985), Messner and Vives (2005), and Vives (2014); for example of the second type, see Angeletos, La’O and Iovino (2016a), Colombo, Femminis and Pavan (2014), Llosa and Venkateswaran ”
Big Data as a Governance Mechanism (2019, background): “Strategic complementarities in trading decisions can lead to excess volatility in trading and prices if traders herd on information (Froot et al. 1992; Veldkamp 2006a, 2006b; Amador and Weill 2010; Garcia and Strobl 2011).”
Information Acquisition and Welfare (2014, background): “Importantly, use (2) and (4) to note that possible discrepancies between the social and the private benefit of more precise private information originate in either (i) the inefficiency of the equilibrium use of information (that is, the discrepancy between the rule (·; ) and the rule ∗(·; ”
Trading Frenzies and Their Impact on Real Investment (2013, background): “Papers in this literature include Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992), Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994), Veldkamp (2006a, 2006b), Ganguli and Yang (2009), Amador and Weill (2010), and Garcia and Strobl (2011). In these papers, strategic complementarities are in the decision on informati”
Public and Private Learning from Prices, Strategic Substitutability and Complementarity, and Equilibrium Multiplicity (2011, unknown): “Medrano and Vives (2004), Amador and Weill (2010), and Hatchondo et al. (2010) explore the implications of the private learning channel from prices (respectively, on the welfare analysis of insider trading, on the welfare impact of public information, and on the ampli cation e¤ect of aggregate…”