A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies
By Jonas Häckner. Journal of Economics Theory, 2000
562 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b6e2c4a6474ecedc00ecd0ea757a20008aeaac93
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Maria Alipranti
- Chrysovalantou Milliou
- Emmanuel Petrakis
- Constantine Manasakis
- Minas Vlassis
- Min-Ning Yu
- George Symeonidis
- Anna Nagurney
In Marketing
- Maria Alipranti
- Chrysovalantou Milliou
- Emmanuel Petrakis
- Constantine Manasakis
- Minas Vlassis
- Anna Nagurney
- Min-Ning Yu
- George Symeonidis
In Strategy and Management
- Min-Ning Yu
- Maria Alipranti
- Chrysovalantou Milliou
- Emmanuel Petrakis
- Constantine Manasakis
- Minas Vlassis
- Anna Nagurney
- George Symeonidis
Citations in the corpus
- Evolutionary Competition in a Mixed Market with Socially Concerned Firms (2014, unknown): “Taking into account that ∂U=∂xPj ¼ pP and ∂U=∂xSj ¼ pS for all j, we obtain the inverse demands as (see similarly Häckner, 2000) pP ¼ 1 XP γXS pS ¼ a XS γXP ; aZ1; ð2Þ where XP ¼∑mk ¼ 1xPk is the total quantity of the P-firms, XS ¼∑N mk ¼ 1 xSk is the total quantity of the S-firms, and xli is the…”
- Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product R&D (2003, methodology): “1 Bester and Petrakis (1993), who also analysed a game of investment in process R&D using a linear demand structure, obtained results different from those of Qiu (1997) because in their model only one firm was allowed to invest in R&D. 3 I analyse here a variant of the standard linear demand model.”
- Price vs. Quantity Competition in a Vertically Related Market (2014, background): “9 This corresponds to the so-called commitment problem, due toHart and Tirole (1990), and further analyzed byO’Brien and Shaffer (1992),McAfee and Schwartz (1994, 1995), Rey and Vergé (2004) and de Fontenay and Gans (2005), that an upstream monopolist faces when it deals with multiple competing down”
- Differentiated Duopoly with Asymmetric Costs (2006, unknown): “Demand asymmetry can be interpreted as a quality difference between the products supplied by the two firms, as in Hackner (2000).5 With linear demand and cost functions, cost and demand asymmetry can be captured by a single index: a = (α1 − c1) − (α2 − c2).”
- Complexity Analysis of a Cournot-Bertrand Duopoly Game Model with Limited Information (2013, background): “Häckner [11], Zanchettin [12], and Arya et al.”
- The Cournot–Bertrand model and the degree of product differentiation (2011, background): “However, recent work by Häckner (2000), Zanchettin (2006), Arya et al. (2008), and Tremblay et al. (2009) shows that technological, institutional, and demand asymmetries can cause the Bertrand or Cournot–Bertrand outcomes to be optimal.”
- Sustainable Fashion Supply Chain Management Under Oligopolistic Competition and Brand Differentiation (2012, background): “Singh and Vives (1984), Häckner (2000), Shy (1996), and Carlton and Perloff (2004)) but are not limited to being linear, as is commonly assumed in economics.”
- The Cournot-Bertrand Profit Differential : A Reversal Result In A Differentiated Duopoly With Wage Bargaining (2004, unknown): “Hackner (2000) has shown that the result concerning the dominance of Cournot over”
- Downstream Mode of Competition with Upstream Market Power (2014, background): “…more efficient.1,2 1 Keeping the assumption for exogenous and identical marginal costs across firms, but allowing for vertical quality differences across the horizontally differentiated goods, Häckner (2000) finds that when goods are complements, Bertrand profits are higher than the Cournot ones.”