Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution

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Dynamically Consistent Cooperative Solution in a Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution (2007, background): “Though Refs. [ 6 , 10] provided time-consistent solutions in cooperative environmental games, their models does not distinguish the government from the industrial sector in any regions.”
Dynamic Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution (2009, background): “Jørgensen and Zaccour [110] propose a decomposition over time of the total side payment as determined by the Nash bargaining solution to sustain cooperation in a downstream pollution game.”
Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues: 3. application to water resources (2006, background): “Starting from a non-cooperative scenario, Jorgensen and Zaccour, 2001 draw an intertemporal side payments scheme based on the egalitarian principle (to divide the surplus equally among the regions).”