Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: an experimental study
By Klaus Abbink. 2004
240 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b2d11021f41e3e4c7619cd305782a9e3e1d4b4ed
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Olivier Armantier
- A. Barr
- P. Serneels
- A. Boly
- James T. Murphy
- Marcel Fafchamps
- Philip E. Keefer
- Stephen F. Knack
In Safety Research
- Olivier Armantier
- M. Lindelow
- A. Barr
- P. Serneels
- A. Boly
- James T. Murphy
- Stephen F. Knack
- Philip E. Keefer
In Sociology and Political Science
Citations in the corpus
- Corruption in Public Service delivery: an experimental Analysis (2009, background): “Abbink et al. (2002) developed and Abbink (2004; 2005) applied a game in which one actor can choose to bribe another and thereby induce him or her to increase both their earnings at a cost to other subjects.”
- Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes (2013, unknown): “com) estimates that close to half a billion rupees was p id as bribes in 21 months in India to receive land documents, marriage certifica es, electricity connections, admissions in preferred colleges and registering ho me purchases or police complaints.(3) Transparency International’s Corruption Per”
- A controlled field experiment on corruption (2011, background): “3See e.g. Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2000, 2002), Abbink (2004), Jacquemet (2005), or Lambsdor¤ and Frank (2007).”