An Analysis of Earnings Management by European Private Firms

By Laurent Coppens, E. Peek. 2003

266 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Bank earnings and regulatory capital management using available for sale securities (2017, unknown): “Coppens and Peek (2005), Graham et al. (2005), Burgstahler et al. (2006), and Hope et al. (2013) reveal that non-listed firms also perceive earnings management as important.”
The Importance of Reporting Incentives: Earnings Management in European Private and Public Firms (2006, unknown): “The recent work by Coppens and Peek (2005) is a notable exception, suggesting that taxes could play a role in observed earnings”
Audit effort and earnings management (2008, background): “Similarly, private companies might manage earnings downwards for tax reasons (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Coppens and Peek, 2005), although auditors may not prevent this because their primary incentive is to prevent earnings from being overstated (Kinney and Martin, 1994; Nelson et al.”
Earnings Management and Audit Quality in Europe: Evidence from the Private Client Segment Market (2008, background): “Typical explanations of why private firms would potentially engage in earnings management are tax minimization and obtaining better terms of trade with banks, suppliers, customers, employees and government (Coppens and Peek, 2005).”
Earnings Management When Incentives Compete: The Role of Tax Accounting in Russia (2004, unknown): “Coppens and Peek (2005) show the distribution of earnings levels for high versus low alignment European countries.”