What Determines Cartel Success

By Margaret C. Levenstein, V. Suslow. 2002

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Common ownership and competition in product markets (2021, neutral): “, see Malueg (1992), Davidson and Deneckere (1984), López and Vives (2018).”
Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence (2015, background): “The RD treatment allows us to analyze the emergence 20As Levenstein and Suslow (2006) outline cartels break down in some cases because of cheating, but more frequently beacaues of entry, exogenous shocks, and dynamic changes within the industry.”
Network Analysis of World Trade using the BACI-CEPII Dataset (2014, neutral): “Domestic markets are highly concentrated, incumbent firms often form cartels (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006; Röller and Steen, 2006) and high capital costs and the access to limestone reserves act as an entry barrier for potential entrants.”
Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices* (2011, background): “The agreed-upon allocation for 1992 for the global and European markets is shown in Table 1.2 Cartel 1 Information about recent cartels can be found in John M. Connor (2001), Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow (2004), Harrington (2006), and Levenstein and Suslow (2006).”