Defining and assessing animal pain

By Lynne U. Sneddon, R. W. Elwood, Shelley A. Adamo, Matthew C. Leach. 2014

289 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Animal Science and Zoology, Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics, Small Animals

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b153c387d9afc3908ab3ff75f752c4274cd23c1a

Citations in the corpus

• Minds without spines: Evolutionarily inclusive animal ethics (2020, unknown): “Their reasoning is that pain behavior can be reproduced by systems that are clearly incapable of experiencing pain, and thus ‘insects, and possibly other animals, could use simple processing rules to produce pain-like behaviour, without any internal experience of pain’ (Sneddon et al. 2014).”
• Animal sentience and the precautionary principle (2017, unknown): “Such lists, comprising a mix of neurological and behavioural criteria, already exist with respect to animal pain (Bateson 1991; Smith and Boyd 1991; Sneddon et al. 2014).”