Market Structure and Equilibrium

By Heinrich von Stackelberg. 2010

605 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Deep Declarative Networks (2019, methodology): “Formally, we can think of the learning problem as an upper optimization problem and the network output as being obtained from a lower optimization problem within a bi-level optimization framework [4, 39].”
A Game Theoretic Framework for Model Based Reinforcement Learning (2020, methodology): “While good workhorses are lacking for general games, Stackelberg games (von Stackelberg, 1934) are an exception.”
Social behavior for autonomous vehicles (2019, positive): “In the traditional two-agent Stackelberg game (43), the leader ( i = 1) makes its choice of policy, u 1 , and the follower ( i = 2) maximizes their control given the leader policy, u ∗ 2 ( u 1 ) .”
A bilevel model for electricity retailers' participation in a demand response market environment (2013, background): “The fact that the consumption schedule is decided after the communication of the price signal by the retailer implies that there is a leader–follower structure typical of Stackelberg games, whichwere introduced in the original version of thework later translated in von Stackelberg (2011).”
Self-Tuning Networks: Bilevel Optimization of Hyperparameters using Structured Best-Response Functions (2019, background): “Bilevel programs were first studied in economics to model leader/follower firm dynamics (Von Stackelberg, 2010) and have since found uses in various fields (see Colson et al. (2007) for an overview).”