Transmission Cost Allocation by Cooperative Games and Coalition Formation

By J. Zolezzi, H. Rudnick. IEEE Power Engineering Review, 2002

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An Aumann-Shapley Approach to Allocate Transmission Service Cost Among Network Users in Electricity Markets (2007, methodology): “Several methodologies for the pricing of transmission services have been proposed, mostly based on marginal pricing [4], [8] or on grid-usage [5]–[7], [14].”
Transmission Expansion Planning in Electricity Markets (2008, methodology): “The solution techniques proposed can be classified as mathematical optimization methods, such as: linear programming [2], [3], mixed-integer linear programming [4], [5], Benders decomposition [6], and dynamic programming methods [7]; heuristic methods based on sigmoid functions [8], intelligent syst”
Duality Approaches to Economic Lot‐Sizing Games (2016, background): “…a common water supply sys-tem (Young et al. 1982); different market agents in power industry use common transmission and distribution networks (Zolezzi and Rudnick 2002); recipients of multicasted contents make shared use of network transmission services (Feigenbaum et al. 2000); in states…”
Multi-Stage Flexible Expansion Co-Planning Under Uncertainties in a Combined Electricity and Gas Market (2015, unknown): “Examples of game theory models used in transmission planning are: [43], [44], [45], [46], [36].”