Information-Theoretic Security Without an Honest Majority
By Anne Broadbent, Alain Tapp. 2007
78 citations recorded by the source corpus.
We present six multiparty protocols with information-theoretic security that tolerate an arbitrary number of corrupt participants. All protocols assume pairwise authentic private channels and a broadcast channel (in a single case, we require a simultaneous broadcast channel). We give protocols for veto, vote, anonymous bit transmission, collision detection, notification and anonymous message transmission. Not assuming an honest majority, in most cases, a single corrupt participant can make the protocol abort. All protocols achieve functionality never obtained before without the use of either computational assumptions or of an honest majority.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Henry Corrigan-Gibbs
- Dan Boneh
- Brent Waters
- Allison Bishop
- Xavier Boyen
- Craig Gentry
- Amit Sahai
- Xiaodong Lin
Citations in the corpus
- Prio: Private, Robust, and Scalable Computation of Aggregate Statistics (2017, methodology): “Prior systems have made use of specific AFEs for sums [56, 86], standard deviations [100], counts [28, 92], and least-squares regression [82].”