Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress
By M. Bombardini, Francesco Trebbi. 2008
115 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/af984d15ece1e48fae074050736d60b3425d07ec
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Marianne Bertrand
- Raymond J. Fisman
- Francesco Trebbi
- M. Bombardini
- Jordan I. Siegel
- Chen Lin
- Randall K. Morck
- Benjamin A. Olken
Citations in the corpus
- U.S. Multinationals and Preferential Market Access (2015, unknown): “domestic sales, to capture potential concavity in the political response, loosely in the spirit of Bombardini and Trebbi (2011). Prediction (iii) reflects the opportunity cost of tariff preferences, which is greater the larger the volume of imports that would no longer pay MFN duties.”
- Is it Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process (2011, unknown): “Bertrand et al. (2011) reports a detailed analysis of the degree of specialization across lobbying firms and an analysis of the trends in the number of specialists over time.”
- Individual Political Contributions and Firm Performance (2012, unknown): “On one hand, it is possible that individual contributors are less likely to contribute money to a local politician because they can instead pledge voter support (Bombardini and Trebbi, 2011).”
- Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence (2020, background): “(9)For shadow lobbying see LaPira and Thomas, 2014 and for the use of trade associations in lobbying see Bombardini and Trebbi (2012).”