Legal Protection of Investors, Corporate Governance, and the Cost of Equity Capital
By Kevin C. W. Chen, Zhihong Chen, Kuo-chiang Wei. 2009
623 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aeeecf902d197fa2f6f32346047bf99c8b853625
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Omrane Guedhami
- Sadok El Ghoul
- Dev R. Mishra
- George Serafeim
- Walid Saffar
- Narjess Boubakri
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Christian Leuz
In Finance
- Omrane Guedhami
- Peter D. Wysocki
- Sadok El Ghoul
- Christian Leuz
- Walid Saffar
- Dev R. Mishra
- Mostafa Monzur Hasan
- Narjess Boubakri
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate finance and governance in emerging markets: A selective review and an agenda for future research (2011, background): “Chen et al. (2009) find that, in emerging markets, firmlevel corporate governance has a significantly negative effect on the cost of equity capital and this corporate governance effect is stronger in countries that provide relatively poor legal protection of investors.”
- Corporate boards and the performance of Asian firms: A meta-analysis (2012, background): “Because institutional owners are likely to have very little influence over the firms in which they invest we suspect that they will “select” for good governance and invest only in well governed firms (Chen et al., 2009; Heugens et al., 2009).”
- Corporate Environmental Responsibility and the Cost of Capital: International Evidence (2016, background): “…(measured 6 months after the fiscal year end instead of 10 months after the fiscal year end) following Guay et al. (2005) and Hail and Leuz (2006), and controlling for price momentum estimated as compound stock returns over the past 6 months following Guay et al. (2005) and Chen et al. (2009).”