Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal

By Abhijit Banerjee, Paul J. Gertler, Maitreesh Ghatak. Journal of Political Economy, 2002

605 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Soil Science, Urban Studies

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8a1fed59d1990a41396421868340203ae717d5fe

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Citations in the corpus

Using the Law to Change the Custom (2012, positive): “In the study about the impact of Operation Barga in India, Banerjee et al. (2002) have shown that a moderate legal reform empowering tenants without giving them full landownership can have a positive effect on their incomes (see supra).”
Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling (2010, background): “…and Lanjouw and Levy (2002) on real estate values; Besley (1995), Brasselle et al. (2002), Field (2005), and Do and Iyer (2008) on investment; Banerjee et al. (2002) and Libecap and Lueck (2008) on agricultural productivity, Field (2007) on labor supply; Feder et al. (1988), Place and…”
Land Rights and Economic Development: Evidence from Vietnam (2003, neutral): “References [1] Banerjee, Abhijit, Paul Gertler, and Maitreesh Ghatak.”
Sharecropping efficiency in Ethiopia: threats of eviction and kinship (2007, background): “Bardhan (1984) and Banerjee et al. (2002) developed two-period principal-agent models to show how a threat of eviction upon unsatisfactory performance increased the incentive of the agent to work hard in the first period.”
Skill Transferability, Migration, and Development: Evidence from Population Resettlement in Indonesia (2016, result): “As a comparison, Banerjee et al. (2002) provide econometric evidence that land reforms in West Bengal raised average district-level rice productivity in”
Land reform and agricultural productivity in India: a review of the evidence (2007, methodology): “In fact, a study by Banerjee et al. (2002) that focuses on West Bengal, a state where tenancy reforms were implemented very thoroughly, yields very different conclusions: tenancy reforms improved agricultural productivity.”
Empowering women? Inheritance rights, female education and dowry payments in India (2015, background): “…impact on education.9 This paper also relates to the literature on the role of land rights in enhancing investment incentives in agricultural land [Banerjee et al., 2002, Besley, 1995], residential investment [Field, 2007], entreprenurial investment of retained earnings [Johnson et al., 2003] etc.”
Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders (2014, positive): “Hence, programs that strengthen borrowers’ outside options (similar to the empowerment strategies of poor tenants documented in Banerjee et al., 2002) offer a way to diminish the reliance on credit provided by informal lenders and banks.”
Securing Private Property: Formal versus Informal Institutions (2011, background): “For studies that find positive effects associated with government land titling, see Feder et al. (1988), Banerjee, Gertler, and Ghatak (2002), Do and Iyer (2003) and Field (2005).”
Do Rural Banks Matter? Evidence from the Indian Social Banking Experiment (2005, neutral): “In the first few decades after independence land reform as a program for ushering in a just social order was an important item on almost every state government's policy agenda (Besley and Burgess, 2000; Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak, 2002).”
Land Rental Markets in the Process of Rural Structural Transformation: Productivity and Equity Impacts in China (2008, background): “…uncertainty, wealth constraints, and moral hazard, sharecropping could be a “second” best choice that will be difficult to improve upon unless key parameters of the environment are modified (Shetty 1988, Basu 1992, Otsuka et al. 1992, Laffont and Matoussi 1995, Banerjee et al. 2002, Dubois 2002).”
Growth Theory through the Lens of Development Economics (2004, positive): “Explanations of the persistence of sharecropping involve risk aversion (Stiglitz (1974)) or limited liability (Banerjee et al. (2002)).”
Gender Equality, Poverty and Economic Growth (2007, background): “Using household survey data from Ghana, Doss (1996) finds that the share of assets owned by women in urban households significantly affects household expenditure patterns.”
Market inefficiencies and the adoption of agricultural technologies in developing countries 1 (2013, background): “…no effect because of the high degree of land insecurity in their setting, the use of de facto rather than de jure rights, and the focus on an investment that is accessible to all and is not affected by other barriers. providing additional productivity investment incentives (Banerjee et al. 2002).”
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online (2008, background): “Eviction threats can actually serve as an incentive device in repeated sharecropping contracts ( Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak, 2002; Banerjee and Ghatak, 2004).”
Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricultural Development (2010, background): “Insecurity distorts farmers’ investments (Goldstein and Udry 2008), and increased tenure security can increase farmers’ investment in land (Banerjee et al. 2002; Jacoby et al. 2002).”