Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Consideration of Industry Traits and Corporate Governance Mechanisms

By Mark Beasley, Joseph V. Carcello, Dana R. Hermanson, P. Lapides. 2000

1,185 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Artificial Intelligence

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/acfa853d7fe9033a73ebb4c380e41e3bc28a4d2d

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Citations in the corpus

Antecedents and organisational performance implications of internal audit effectiveness (2010, background): “IA contributes to financial reporting quality and fraud prevention (Beasley et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2004).”
The relation between earnings management and financial statement fraud (2011, background): “42 The ratio of 54 fraud firms to 298 non-fraud firms is based on estimates of the frequency of fraud and the relative cost of making various misclassifications: 0.6% of firms commit financial statement fraud (Bell & Carcello, 2000) and the relative cost of 4.2.6.”
Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors (2009, positive): “…research showing that director independence is associated with improved compensation and disclosure (e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Beasley (2000)), that CEO tenure is correlated with increased CEO influence on compensation decisions (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and…”
The Impact of Audit Committee Existence and Audit Committee Meeting Frequency on the External Audit: Perceptions of Australian Auditors (2007, background): “However, it contrasts with the results of some archival studies that indicate the presence of an audit committee is associated with a lower level of financial statement fraud (Beasley et al., 2000) and more reliable financial reporting (McMullen, 1996).”
Detecting and Predicting Financial Statement Fraud: The Effectiveness of the Fraud Triangle and SAS No. 99 (2008, positive): “For example, Beneish (1997) concludes that sales growth, leverage, and total accruals divided by total assets are useful in identifying GAAP violators and firms that are aggressively using accruals to manipulate earnings.”
Fraud Risk Factor Of The Fraud Triangle Assessing The Likelihood Of Fraudulent Financial Reporting (2011, neutral): “Beasley et al. (2000) found that internal audit existence in fraud companies was less common than that of non-fraud companies.”
Ownership structure, corporate governance, and fraud: Evidence from China (2006, background): “In the U.S., Loebbecke et al. (1989) and Bell et al. (1991) contend that very rapid growth is an indicator of fraud.”
The determinants of financial fraud in Chinese firms: Does corporate governance as an institutional innovation matter? (2017, neutral): “Previous studies based upon western firms (e.g., Loebbecke et al., 1989; Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al., 2000; Farber, 2005; the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission report 1999, 2010; Rezaee and Kedia, 2012) have empirically documented a positive…”
Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management (2011, background): “One powerful disciplining mechanism that could substitute for shareholder monitoring and constrain earnings management is audit committee independence (Beasley et al., 2000; Klein, 1998; Uzun et al., 2004).”
Form versus Substance: The Implications for Auditing Practice and Research of Alternative Perspectives on Corporate Governance (2008, background): “A number of prior studies have reported a link between the strength of corporate governance and financial reporting quality, including finding an association between AC independence and decreases in fraud (Beasley et al. 2000), restatements (Abbott et al.”
Audit Committee, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from India (2016, methodology): “This was done in accordance with the recommendations of Ameer et al. (2010) and Beasley et al. (2000) who proposed that audit committee independence and frequency of meeting of audit committee helped in reducing financial frauds in a firm, thereby possibly enhancing the firm‘s financial performance.”