Phasing: Private Set Intersection Using Permutation-based Hashing

By Benny Pinkas, Thomas Schneider, Gil Segev, Michael Zohner. 2015

343 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Secure Federated Submodel Learning (2019, background): “Compared with Private Set Intersection (PSI) [71]–[76] and Private Set union Cardinality (PSC) [77]– [79], which have received tremendous attention and also have seen several practical applications, such as in social networks [80], [81]; human genome testing [82]; locationbased services [83]; securi”
A Pragmatic Introduction to Secure Multi-Party Computation (2019, methodology): “We now describe the Pinkas-Schneider-Segev-Zohner (PSSZ) construction (Pinkas et al., 2015) building PSI from an OPRF.”
Scalable Private Set Union from Symmetric-Key Techniques (2019, methodology): “A long list of follow-up works [40, 6, 39, 46, 44, 36, 47] improved the eﬃciency of PEQT.”
Scalable Private Set Intersection Based on OT Extension (2018, methodology): “The original Cuckoo hashing procedure [Pagh and Rodler 2004] fixed the number of hash functions k = 2.”
Efficient Batched Oblivious PRF with Applications to Private Set Intersection (2016, methodology): “Our largest improvement is for the case of larger sets (2(24) items each) of long strings (128 bits), which requires 63 seconds in our protocol but 214 seconds using [26].”
MASCOT: Faster Malicious Arithmetic Secure Computation with Oblivious Transfer (2016, unknown): “Pinkas et al. [37, 38] used OT extensions to achieve a very eﬃcient and scalable protocol for the dedicated application of private set intersection.”
An Efficient Toolkit for Computing Private Set Operations (2017, background): “The existing works of [23,22,19] provide even faster designs though these use inherently symmetric primitives which are not comparable with our work.”
Labeled PSI from Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Malicious Security (2018, methodology): “Following the architecture of [43], their protocol instructs the receiver to construct a cuckoo hash table of its setY .”
On Deploying Secure Computing Commercially: Private Intersection-Sum Protocols and their Business Applications (2019, methodology): “In this section, we describe a protocol for intersection-sum based on Random Oblivious Transfer, which is used in existing PSI solutions [45, 43, 19, 47].”
Improved Private Set Intersection Against Malicious Adversaries (2017, background): “Several improvements to this paradigm were suggested in [22].”
Communication-Computation Trade-offs in PIR (2019, methodology): “Our construction leverages Cuckoo hashing [52] in a new way inspired by ideas from private set intersection [13, 24, 58, 60] and oblivious RAM [37, 55, 57].”
Practical Multi-party Private Set Intersection from Symmetric-Key Techniques (2017, methodology): “Finally, the condition of a collision among randomly chosen { z i } values is independent of any single z i . candidate v being chosen (and thus the overall distribution of v ) is the same regardless of whether the receiver queried F on one of It is important to discuss the parameter choice m (lengt”
Private Join and Compute from PIR with Default (2020, background): “Therefore, by adding their local shares i ∈ [ t ] α C ,i and i ∈ [ t ] α S ,i , the client and the server obtain shares of the desired output”
ABY2.0: Improved Mixed-Protocol Secure Two-Party Computation (2020, methodology): “In this section, we give four applications with further improvements: i) AES which benefits from AND3 gates (§6.2), ii) Circuitbased Private Set Intersection (PSI) which benefits from our improved Equality Tests (§6.3), ii) Biometric Matching which benefits from our new dimension-independent Scalar ”