Selling Formal Insurance to the Informally Insured

By A. M. Mobarak, Mark R. Rosenzweig. 2012

304 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Sociology and Political Science, Soil Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/acd89c4c64b9cf887253480a7820558489bdfb02

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Citations in the corpus

Entrepreneurship and Financial Frictions: A Macrodevelopment Perspective (2015, unknown): “A literature exists on the role of both formal and informal insurance in entrepreneurial activities, but much of the work focuses on agricultural investments (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1986; Cai et al., 2009; Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2012; Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2012).”
Market inefficiencies and the adoption of agricultural technologies in developing countries 1 (2013, background): “Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) investigate whether well functioning informal risk markets crowd out the development of more formal markets, and may explain low levels of demand in previous studies.”
Financial Inclusion and Inclusive Growth: A Review of Recent Empirical Evidence (2017, background): “A randomized controlled trial studying the demand for and effect of offering index-based rainfall insurance in the presence of informal risk sharing in India finds that insurance increased the cultivation of riskier rice varieties (Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2012).”
After the Drought: The Impact of Microinsurance on Consumption Smoothing and Asset Protection (2013, unknown): “…informal risk sharing networks, rather than heterogeneous willingness to pay for insurance (Gine, Townsend, and Vickery 2008; Patt, Suarez, and Hess 2010; Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012; Cole et al. 2013; McIntosh, Sarris, and Papadopoulos 2013; Dercon et al. 2014; Cai, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2015).”
How Basis Risk and Spatiotemporal Adverse Selection Influence Demand for Index Insurance: Evidence from Northern Kenya (2014, background): “Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2475187 24 idiosyncratic risk pooling described by Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) and learning through social networks (Cai, de Janvry & Sadoulet 2011).”
The Effect of Microinsurance on Economic Activities: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment (2015, methodology): “…is among the first to examine the causal effect of microinsurance on production behavior using randomized field experiments.6 Related to our study, Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) studied the demand for, and the effects of, offering formal index-based rainfall insurance through a randomized…”
Time versus State in Insurance: Experimental Evidence from Contract Farming in Kenya (2018, background): “Take-up rates have been consistently low across a wide range of geographical settings and insurance designs ( Cole et al. 2013; Elabed et al. 2013; Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012 .”
Offering Rainfall Insurance to Informal Insurance Groups: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Ethiopia (2012, background): “This assumption is more general than that of Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012), in which E[y|(x1, x2) ∈ {(0, x̄), (x̄, 0)}] = E[y|(x1, x2) = (0, 0)] is also assumed.”
The Demand for Microinsurance: A Literature Review (2017, background): “…index insurances (without subsidies) reach a take up rate of 20% in Ethiopia (Hill and Robles (2011)), 17% in Malawi (Giné and Yang (2009)), 16% in India e (Cole et al. (2011a), Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012)), between 6 and 36% in Ethiopia (Norton et al. (2011)), 6% in India (Gaurav et al. (2011)).”
Informal Risk Sharing, Index Insurance and Risk-Taking in Developing Countries (2013, background): “This article describes preliminary findings from three studies undertaken or underway (Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012, 2013a, 2013b) that use the resulting experimental and non-experimental data to explore various facets of the interactions between informal risk sharing, index insurance and risk…”