Energy Pricing and Dispatch for Smart Grid Retailers Under Demand Response and Market Price Uncertainty
By Wei Wei, Feng Liu, ShengWei Mei. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2015
335 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/acade013bcbcadcafc0498c0a5ce97facb600804
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Thomas Morstyn
- Malcolm Duncan McCulloch
- Wei Wei
- ShengWei Mei
- Jianhui Wang
- Cheng Wang
- Alexander Teytelboym
- Nian Liu
In Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
- Malcolm Duncan McCulloch
- Thomas Morstyn
- ShengWei Mei
- Wei Wei
- Alexander Teytelboym
- Jianhui Wang
- Lei Wu
Citations in the corpus
- Network Equilibrium of Coupled Transportation and Power Distribution Systems (2018, background): “A similar problem has been discussed in [16] using robust optimization, in which the aggregator’s profit in the worst-case market price realization is maximized.”
- Multiclass Energy Management for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading Driven by Prosumer Preferences (2019, methodology): “be more appropriate to model its interactions with the prosumers using a bi-level optimisation approach, with the platform owner setting prices to maximise its own profits [44].”
- Designing Decentralized Markets for Distribution System Flexibility (2019, background): “[21]–[24], mean-field game theory [25]–[27] and Stackelberg leader-follower games [28]–[31].”
- Energy Sharing Management for Microgrids With PV Prosumers: A Stackelberg Game Approach (2017, background): “, DR [20]–[22], multimicrogrids [17], [18], and smart community [19].”
- Bilateral Contract Networks for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading (2019, background): “The strategic interactions between prosumers and a supplier that sets prices to maximise profits can be modelled by a Stackelberg game [8], [9].”