Halting degradation of natural resources: is there a role for rural communities?

By J. Baland, J. Platteau. 2000

1,830 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ac52840845763f0c3fa34af8318b5b9a72d5d4ba

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Citations in the corpus

Collective action initiatives to improve marketing performance: Lessons from farmer groups in Tanzania (2009, background): “Of particular importance have been the works of Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990, 1992) and Baland and Platteau (1996).”
Do the Poor Benefit from Devolution Policies? Evidence from Malawi’s Forest Co-Management Program (2006, background): “…have generated some evidence that villagelevel organizations have helped to halt or slow down natural resource degradation (e.g., Jodha 1995; Baland and Platteau 1996; Agrawal and Yadama 1997; Saxena 1997; Chakraborty 2001), few studies have tried to analyze the net benefits of devolution…”
Social Capital and Natural Resource Management (2007, background): “Baland and Platteau (1996) illustrate this idea using Jodha’s (1985) study on commons management in semi-arid areas in India, and Quiggin’s (1993) analysis of rice culture areas in Sri Lanka.”
Strategies For Sustainable Land Management And Poverty Reduction In Uganda (2004, unknown): “Decentralization has greatly affected the local institutions, which are increasingly being viewed as important in natural resource management (Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick 1995; Baland and Platteau 1996; Blackburn and Holland 1998; Raussen et al. 2001).”
The conditions of collective action for local commons management: the case of irrigation in the Philippines (2005, unknown): “of privatization (Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Bardhan, 1993; Baland and Platteau, 1996;”
Participatory Development in the Presence of Endogenous Community Imperfections (2002, background): “…information and repeated encounters reputation effects and sanction mechanisms are at work that induce players to think of the long-term consequences of their present actions [e.g., Ostrom, 1990; Sandler, 1992 ; Baland and Platteau, 1996: Chs.4–6 ; Dixit and Skeath, 1999: Ch.11; Aoki, forthcoming].”
Well-Being Dynamics and Poverty Traps (2016, background): “…are variations on the classic problem of the commons in which communities, as a result of coordination failures, overexploit natural resources, degrading the resource below a recoverable threshold and compromising communities’ future livelihoods (Baland & Platteau 1996, Hardin 1968, Ostrom 1990).”