Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information

By Brian Skyrms. 2010

221 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Multi-Agent Cooperation and the Emergence of (Natural) Language (2016, methodology): “ that force them to get smarter by bootstrapping on top of each other. We leverage ideas from work in linguistics, cognitive science and game theory on the emergence of language (Wagner et al., 2003; Skyrms, 2010; Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Crawford, 1998). Our game is a variation of Lewis’ signali”
Minimal Requirements for the Emergence of Learned Signaling (2014, methodology): “We ﬁrst replicate a basic reinforcement model using Roth – Erev learning as described in Skyrms (2010), before including mechanisms of (a) negative feedback and (b) forgetting (following Barrett & Zollman, 2009), and ﬁnally, as an exploratory measure, (c) gradual turnover.”
What Is Disinformation? (2015, methodology): “However, it is more standard to use the term misinformation to refer to inaccurate information in general (Fox, 1983, p. 201), and to treat disinformation as a proper subset of misinformation (Floridi, 2011, p. 260; Skyrms, 2010, p. 80).”
The Evolution of Vagueness (2014, background): “But unfortunately, prior work in evolutionary game theory has 2 For more on signaling games, see Skyrms (2010). shown that this plan is doomed from the start.”
Emergence of Linguistic Communication from Referential Games with Symbolic and Pixel Input (2018, background): “In classic signaling games, this polysemy phenomenon manifests itself as different states receiving the same signal and is termed partial pooling equilibrium (Skyrms, 2010).”