The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance
By Scott D. Dyreng, Michelle Hanlon, Edward L. Maydew. 2010
1,560 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aa44814d876c8bd1dd1006491c7692c2a2a20d8c
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Terry Shevlin
- Michelle Hanlon
- Shivaram Rajgopal
- Weili Ge
- Liandong Zhang
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- Mostafa Monzur Hasan
- John R. Graham
In Economics and Econometrics
- Tarek Abdelfattah
- Terry Shevlin
- Gordon Richardson
- Jennifer Blouin
- Roman Lanis
- Edward L. Maydew
- Michelle Hanlon
- Thomas C. Omer
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance (2015, background): “1 For example, Dyreng et al. (2010) report evidence that executives who were previously employed by firms that are characterized as tax aggressive seem to import this aggressiveness to their new employer.”
- Do CFOs Have Style? An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of Individual CFOs on Accounting Practices* (2011, background): “As a result, our sample construction is somewhat different and more complicated than in similar studies (Dyreng et al. 2010; Bamber et al. 2010; Yang 2010).”
- Taxes and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Linguistic Cues (2015, positive): “…a wide set of firm-level determinants identified in prior literature that affect corporate tax avoidance (Mills (1998), Manzon and Plesko (2002), Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009), Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010), Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010), Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt (2013)).”