International Tax Coordination: Regionalism Versus Globalism
By P. Sørensen. Social Science Research Network, 2004
147 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor. I study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem, using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature. The model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination. With high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world, the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination, even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aa3ee2baa9ca3a931c793f7bcb1ae9a7d2e804e0
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Citations in the corpus
- Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And Should They? (2007, unknown): “For an overview and discussion of alternative methods, see Sørensen (2004).”
- Company Tax Reform in the European Union (2004, methodology): “As demonstrated in Sørensen (2001a), the model may also be given a political economy interpretation in which the simulated welfare gain represents the utility gain of the median voter who prefers some redistribution because his level of wealth is below the average wealth per capita, given the…”
- International Tax Competition and Coordination (2014, unknown): “On the CCCTB debate, see Sørensen (2004b), Bettendorf, Devereux, van der Horst and Loretz (2011).”
- Decentralized Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local Governments (2010, unknown): “It is also possible in the case of corporate income taxes on foreign owned firms (Sørensen 2002).”
- Regional Tax Coordination and Foreign Direct Investment (2001, unknown): “Finally, Sørensen (2000, 2001) carries out a set of simulation analyses in an extended, asymmetric model where countries differ from each other and distributional effects arise within each country.”