Privacy and the New Energy Infrastructure

By E. Quinn. 2009

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Citations in the corpus

A Comprehensive Comparison of Multiparty Secure Additions with Differential Privacy (2015, background): “An electricity usage profile of a single household may reveal information about electric appliances used in the household as well as the number and routines of its inhabitants [14], [46].”
Privacy-preserving smart metering (2011, background): “The damage that smart meters can cause to users’ privacy has previously been studied both from a technical perspective [7], [8] and from a legal perspective [1], [9].”
Smart meter data: Balancing consumer privacy concerns with legitimate applications (2012, background): “(Quinn, 2009) Use by family members and other coinhabitants One householder „spying‟ on another e.g. parents checking if their children are sleeping or staying up late playing video games.”
Smart Grid Communications: Overview of Research Challenges, Solutions, and Standardization Activities (2011, background): “In particular, frequent data collection from smart meters reveals a wealth of information about residential appliance usage, as discussed in [54].”
Smart meter privacy using a rechargeable battery: Minimizing the rate of information leakage (2011, background): “A concern, from the customer point-of-view, is loss of privacy [2, 3].”
Privacy-Preserving Aggregation of Time-Series Data (2011, background): “See [15] for a sampling of what might be gleaned from your finegrained electrical usage.”
Privacy for Smart Meters: Towards Undetectable Appliance Load Signatures (2010, background): “In an elaborate review, Quinn [6] argues that AMI provides a window into the activities within homes, exposing once private activities to anyone with access to electricity usage information.”
Smart Grid Privacy via Anonymization of Smart Metering Data (2010, background): “1, reproduced from [4], which discusses these privacy concerns at length with regards to expected and/or projected availability of high-frequency metering data.”
Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey (2017, background): “Similarly, the physical properties of this component, in addition to the physical properties of the object of interest in the physical world that the CPS controls and monitors, can also cause unexpected attacks that might result in non-physical attacks, such as misleading information sent to a CPS.”