Microeconomics of Banking, 2nd Edition
By Xavier Freixas, Jean-Charles Rochet. 2008
208 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a8e598a00d6c91fe41e8db9dd40c19171933f8be
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Citations in the corpus
- How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises (2013, background): “Nonetheless, the reviews in Freixas and Rochet (2008) suggest that the scales are tilted in favor of the prediction that capital has a salutary effect on the probability of survival.”
- Systemic Risks and the Macroeconomy (2010, methodology): “Extending the identifi cation procedure introduced in Canova and De Nicolò (2002), we identify a chosen set of orthogonal innovations as structural shocks if they satisfy certain sign restrictions on key variables derived from aggregate dynamic macroeconomic theory and a simple banking model. Specif”
- Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort (2016, background): “For example, Goodfried and King 3For an excellent survey of the issue see Freixas and Rochet (2008).”
- The Financial Stress Index: Identification of Systemic Risk Conditions (2011, unknown): “34 Freixas and Rochet (2008), p. 198: “[The] external finance premium, defined as the wedge between the cost of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of internal funds, [is] an essential key in understanding of the transmission mechanism.””
- Interbank Tiering and Money Center Banks (2010, unknown): “The banking literature, elegantly summarized by Freixas and Rochet (2008), examines individual bank incentives with no concern for how banks position themselves in a larger network.”
- Efficiency and Risk in European Banking (2011, unknown): “In parallel, and depending on the focus and modelling strategy, the theoretical literature offers contradictory results as to the effects of capital requirements on bank risk- taking incentives (see Berger et al., 1995; Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Santos, 1999; Boot et al., 1998).”
- Bank Risk Taking and Liquidity Creation Following Regulatory Interventions and Capital Support (2011, unknown): “While Germany, unlike the U.S., does not have a formal framework for prompt corrective action that ties individual regulatory measures to thresholds in terms of bank capitalization, the 8 See Freixas and Rochet (2008) for an overview on the literature on the market discipline role of bank leverage.”