Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations

By Martin A. Nowak, Karl Sigmund. 1992

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Citations in the corpus

Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas (2017, background): “The empirical payoﬀ matrices are themselves valid matrix games.”
The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. (2012, background): “…on direct reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1990; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993; Nowak and Sigmund, 1992) led to a number of experiments showing the power of (stochastic) repetition for promoting cooperation and exploring the…”
Good neighbour, bad neighbour: song sparrows retaliate against aggressive rivals (2009, unknown): “He suggested that the lack of retaliation might indicate that these birds were using a more forgiving variant of Tit for Tat ( Nowak & Sigmund 1992 ), one that might work better between neighbours with long-term associations than a less forgiving strategy.”
Communication and collective action: language and the evolution of human cooperation (2010, background): “…errors of perception (mistakenly classifying a response as defect) and of commission (accidentally violating the reciprocity rule), either of which can lock tit-for-tat players into an endless sequence of mutual defection (Boyd & Lorberbaum, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 1992; Selten & Hammerstein, 1984).”
From parasitism to mutualism: partner control in asymmetric interactions (2002, background): “Boyd 1989; Nowak & Sigmund 1992; Nowak & Sigmund 1993) may all combine with the threat of terminating the encounter, pushing interactions further towards cooperation.”
Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games (2012, background): “[10] Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1992) Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations.”
Behaviour in commons dilemmas: Homo economicus and Homo psychologicus in an ecological-economic model (2000, background): “by equipping the automata with a memory for the behaviour of other automata (Lindgren and Nordahl, 1995; Molander, 1985; Nowak and Sigmund, 1992), or by equipping the automata with evolutionary strategies (genetic algorithms), which allowed them to adapt their choice behaviour to the behaviour of th”