Designing and Implementing Malicious Hardware

By Samuel T. King, Joseph A. Tucek, Anthony Cozzie, Chris Grier, Weihang Jiang, Yuanyuan Zhou. USENIX Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats, 2008

320 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Stuxnet worm impact on industrial cyber-physical system security (2011, background): “consider also the possibility that the software part may be compromised or even the hardware itself may be partially designed to enable a multitude of attacks [14].”
A Survey of Hardware Trojan Taxonomy and Detection (2010, methodology): “considered the malicious circuit design space and introduced hardware components that can enable several attacks.(11) In particular, they designed and implemented the Illinois Malicious Processor with a modified CPU.”
Hardware Trojan: Threats and emerging solutions (2009, background): “Finally, we discuss the major challenges in the field of Trojan detection and describe future research directions.”
Detecting and Preventing Cyber Insider Threats: A Survey (2018, background): “Removable media such as USB thumb drives and USB mass storage devices is a relatively clumsy means to deliver the malware but still pervasively dangerous [26], [27], which usually infects the victim’s host through a featured malicious ‘autorun’ payload [28].”
FANCI: identification of stealthy malicious logic using boolean functional analysis (2013, methodology): “FANCI uses scalable, approximate, boolean functional analysis to detect these wires.”
Hardware Trojan Attacks: Threat Analysis and Countermeasures (2014, unknown): “[25] S.”