Corporate Governance Reform and Executive Incentives: Implications for Investments and Risk Taking

By Daniel A. Cohen, Aiyesha Dey, Thomas Z Lys. 2013

145 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a761e3e6fc9d5dd10d1377f95f41cd8fa218e6c6

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In Accounting

1. Suman Neupane
2. Andrew Marshall
3. Santosh Koirala

In Finance

1. Suman Neupane
2. Andrew Marshall
3. Santosh Koirala

Citations in the corpus

• Corporate governance reform and risk-taking: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in an emerging market (2020, result): “8 also increase the compliance burden, discouraging corporate risk-taking, as documented by previous studies (Coles et al., 2008; Bargeron et al., 2010; Cohen and Dey, 2013).”
• Firm Life Cycle, Corporate Risk Taking, and Investor Sentiment (2017, unknown): “A negative association is also reported by Cohen et al. (2013).”
• Substitution between Real and Accruals-Based Earnings Management after Voluntary Adoption of Compensation Clawback Provisions (2015, unknown): “Carter, Lynch, and Zechman (2009) and Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2013), for example, find that the passage of SOX reduces accruals manipulation, and the reduced earnings manipulation allows firms to put more weight on accounting earnings in the determination of the CEO’s annual bonus.”