Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks

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Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation (2015, background): “A recent literature considers intermediation under consumer naiveté, in which buyers find it difficult to evaluate the complex products on offer (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012) or misperceive some product attributes (Murooka, 2015).”
Strategic Obfuscation and Consumer Protection Policy (2014, unknown): “Piccione and Spiegler (2012) provide a framework of obfuscation where firms can choose different price frames, that when combined will result in different levels of comparability for consumers. In an earlier version, Piccione and Spiegler (2009), the authors also consider prominence by studying a ve”
Rating Agencies in the Face of Regulation (2013, unknown): “13Endogenous information acquisition can also be found in the setting of Inderst and Ottaviani (2012), who study the quality of customer-specific advice by an intermediary.”
Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking (2016, unknown): “Inderst and Ottaviani ð2012Þ study the interplay of intrinsic motivation with common agency.”
Financial Literacy, Present Bias and Alternative Mortgage Products (2017, unknown): “As Cocco (2013) acknowledges, agency problems like those modelled in Inderst & Ottaviani (2012) may also play a role and AMPs may be sold predominantly to consumers with lower financial literacy or behavioral traits such as present bias.”