An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment (2020, background): “Similar problems have been modelled for ethical choices that involve various levels of welfare and population size (Arrhenius, 2000).”
In Defence of Repugnance (2008, unknown): “2See Anglin 1977; Sikora 1978; 1981; Ng 1990, pp. 191–3; Attfield 1991, pp. 127–30; Ryberg 1996; Fotion 1997; Tännsjö 2002; and Broome 2004, pp. 210–14.”
Impossibility and Uncertainty Theorems in AI Value Alignment (or why your AGI should not have a utility function) (2018, background): “Arrhenius’s unpublished book contains a collection of many more uncertainty theorems.”
Utilitarianism and the Theory of Justice (2002, unknown): “More general impossibility results are reported in Arrhenius (1997), Blackorby, Bossert, Donaldson and Fleurbaey (1998), Blackorby and Donaldson (1991), Carlson (1998) and Ng (1989).”