If You're so Smart, Why Aren't You Rich? Belief Selection in Complete and Incomplete Markets

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Belief Disagreements and Collateral Constraints (2013, background): “Recent research (e.g., Sandroni, 2000, Blume and Easley, 2006, and Cao, 2011) has demonstrated the limitations of this hypothesis, by showing that traders with inaccurate (and heterogeneous) beliefs may have a permanent presence when nancial markets are incomplete.”
The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences (2007, methodology): “The pairwise random matching framework adopted here yields insights complementing those obtained in other models of interaction, including the local interaction models studied by Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked (1998) and the market models studied by Mailath and Sandroni (2003), Sandroni (2000, 2004), ”
Complex Evolutionary Systems in Behavioral Finance (2008, background): “Blume and Easley (1992, 2006) have shown however that the market selection hypothesis does not always hold and that non-rational agents may survive in the market.”
Information Heterogeneity and the Speed of Learning in Social Networks (2013, neutral): “Finally, our paper is related to the literatures in decision theory and information economics that provide foundations for the concept of relative entropy, such as Sandroni (2000), Blume and Easley (2006), Lehrer and Smorodinsky (2000), and Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano (2012).”