Theory of Games and Economic Behavior

By Robert Leonard. 2006

9,969 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Game & Decision Theory, Economics & Operations Research

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Citations in the corpus

Frank-Wolfe Algorithms for Saddle Point Problems (2016, background): “Similarly, two-player games [22] can often be solved as bilinear minimax problems.”
Aligning AI With Shared Human Values (2020, methodology): “We do not formulate this as a regression task since utilities are defined up to a positive affine transformation (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) and since collecting labels for similarly good scenarios would be difficult with a coarse numeric scale.”
A Variational Inequality Perspective on Generative Adversarial Networks (2018, background): “Each of these formulations can be understood as a two-player game, in the sense of game theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), and can be addressed as a variational inequality problem (VIP) (Harker and Pang, 1990), a framework that encompasses traditional saddle point optimization algorithms…”
Implicit Quantile Networks for Distributional Reinforcement Learning (2018, background): “…if a decision policy is consistent with a particular set of four axioms regarding its choices then the decision policy behaves as though it is maximizing the expected value of some utility function U (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947), This is perhaps the most pervasive notion of risk-sensitivity.”
Introduction to Online Convex Optimization (2016, background): “Game theory was founded in the late 1920’s-early ’30s, whose cornerstone was laid in the classic text “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” by von Neumann and Morgenstern (81).”
Emergent Communication through Negotiation (2018, methodology): “In this paper, we study communication in the negotiation game (see Figure 1), an established model of non-cooperative games in classical game theory (Nash, 1950b; Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Nash, 1950a; 1951; Schelling, 1960; Binmore et al., 1986; Peters, 2008).”
Evolutionary Dynamics of Multi-Agent Learning: A Survey (2015, background): “Game theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Gibbons, 1992) is a theory of interactive strategic decision making, and is therefore of utmost importance for multi-agent systems.”
Emergence of group rationality from irrational individuals (2011, background): “[Behav Ecol] In its original economic setting, rational choice theory pre-dicts behavior under the assumption that humans act to maximize utility, an implicit measure of net benefit (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).”
Rational Expectations and Farsighted Stability (2017, background): “…of Warwick and Department of Economics, Ashoka University Rajiv Vohra Department of Economics, Brown University In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann–Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness.”
Logical Induction (2016, background): “See https://intelligence.org/files/LogicalInductionAbridged.pdf for an abridged version of this paper.”
A review of agent‐based modeling of climate‐energy policy (2020, background): “The origins of ABM can be traced back to mathematical game theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).”
From Games to Giving: Social Value Orientation Predicts Donations to Noble Causes (2007, methodology): “This tradition of research, which is theoretically and methodologically rooted in game theory (i.e., Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), has contributed enormously to our understanding of the cognitive and motivational underpinnings of cooperation and competition in dyads and…”
AN OLD‐NEW CONCEPT OF CONVEX RISK MEASURES: THE OPTIMIZED CERTAINTY EQUIVALENT (2007, background): “Under the axiomatic foundation of von-Neumann and Morgrnstern (1947), a decision maker is assumed to have a utility function, and a random variable X is preferred to Y , which we denote X Y , if and only if Eu(X ) ≥ Eu(Y ).”
Computational techniques for the verification of hybrid systems (2003, background): “The original work of Ramadge and Wonham [13] brought the use of discrete state systems to control, though parallels can be drawn between this work and that of Church, Büchi, and Landweber [3], [14], who originally analyzed the von Neumann–Morgenstern [2] discrete games.”
Approximate Models and Robust Decisions (2014, methodology): “In the absence of a true model, Wald interpreted the decision problem as a zero sum two-person game, following von Neumann and Morgenstern’s work on game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947).”