Insufficient incentives for investment in electricity generations

By Karsten Neuhoff, Laurens de Vries. 2004

187 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a4750dc809e003463cdf4feb9809939b4e99fd4f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

1. T. Ho
2. Brendan Schneiderman
3. Chi-Keung Woo
4. Nate Toyama
5. W. Fichtner
6. Andreas Bublitz
7. K. Chawla
8. Jack Moore

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. W. Fichtner
2. Florian Zimmermann

Citations in the corpus

• Merit-order effects of renewable energy and price divergence in California’s day-ahead and real-time electricity markets (2016, background): “…prices, even with occasional spikes during hours of severe shortage, may not suffice to justify the CT and CCGT investment necessary for reliable grid operation (Neuhoff and Vries, 2004; Wangensteen et al., 2005; Roques et al., 2005; Newbery, 2010; Milstein and Tishler, 2012; Brattle Group, 2012).”
• A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms (2019, methodology): “Furthermore, investors are usually rather risk-averse, i.e., building less capacity than risk-neutral investors would (Neuhoff and de Vries, 2004).”