Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting with Multiple Projects

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Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions (2005, unknown): “(14)Note that such a wage scheme is reminiscent of the literature on deferred compensation; see Lazear (1981) and Akerlof and Katz (1989).”
Risk Allocation and the Costs and Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships (2012, background): “9On this, see also Laux (2001) although this paper is not concerned with organizational design per se.”
Optimal securitization with moral hazard (2012, background): “A concept similar the information enhancement effect is present, although in a static setting, in Laux (2001), in which a manager’s limited liability constraint can be relaxed by creating a contract that is contingent on multiple outcomes.”
Inside and Outside Liquidity (2011, background): “…of the monitoring activity is that the bank acquires information that is relevant for decision-making and uses it to convince the board not to rubberstamp (what turns 6For more on diversification in this type of model, see Conning (2004), Hellwig (2000), Laux (2001) and Tirole (2006, chapter 4).”