Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach

By Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Eftichios S. Sartzetakis. 2006

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Dynamic Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution (2009, background): “• Stackelberg leadership [11, 55, 172] • Transfers [40, 103] • Reputation effects [36, 103, 106] • Issue linkages [12, 26, 41, 125, 127, 139, 154] • Punishments [12, 13] • Regional rather than global agreements [7]”
A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements (2010, background): “Some of them are: Stackelberg leadership of signatories [2, 13, 34], transfers [10, 23], reputation effects [23, 24, 8], issue linkages [6, 7, 3, 25, 11, 12, 28], including a minimum participation clause [9], and considering modest emission reduction targets [20].”
Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited (2006, background): “Other concepts, such as far-sightedness, have been developed, for instance, by Ecchia and Mariotti (1997,1998), Ray and Vohra (2001) and Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2002b); see Finus (2001) and Wagner (2001) for excellent overviews, and, more recently, Barrett (2003) for a broad exposition of the…”