Tax Competition When Governments Lack Commitment: Excess Capacity as a Countervailing Threat

By E. Janeba. 2000

132 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a10c4e4d4891b6850055b52e6c51a657f421594e

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Citations in the corpus

Capital tax competition: bane or boon (2004, background): “In a related analysis, Janeba (2000) explains how a firm can take advantage of fiscal”
Tax Competition When Firms Choose Their Organizational Form: Should Tax Loopholes for Multinationals Be Closed? (2005, background): “3 One exception is Janeba (2000), who analyzes the incentives for a monopolist to install capacities in each of two countries, in order to induce tax competition between them.”
Who is Afraid of Political Risk? Multinational Firms and Their Choice of Capital Structure (2010, unknown): “This may induce the investor to choose an inefficient technology (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1984), inefficient investment paths (Thomas and Worrall, 1994; Schnitzer, 1999) or excess capacity (Janeba, 2000).”
Tax Competition in a Fiscal Union with Decentralized Leadership (2003, background): “26See Kehoe [20], Janeba [18], and Perroni and Scharf [27] for a related cautious argument on the desirability of federally-mediated policy coordination.”
A Nash bargaining solution to models of tax and investment competition: tolls and investment in serial transport corridors (2010, background): “…the seminal paper by Mintz and Tulkens (1986), an extensive literature has been developed; important contributions include, among many others, Kanbur and Keen (1993), Wilson (1999), Janeba (2000), Zodrow (2003), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003), Wilson and Wildasin (2004), and Borck and Pflüger (2006).”
International Tax Competition and Coordination (2014, unknown): “Wilson and Janeba (2005) and Kessing, Konrad and Kotsogiannis (2009) highlight this latter strategic effect in different competition frameworks.”