Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
By Jeffrey S. Banks, John Duggan. 2005
146 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a0bbaafc4417b3ed1f8db8d7ce209e24237d78da
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Political Science and International Relations
Citations in the corpus
- Modeling the interaction of parties, activists and voters: Why is the political center so empty? (2005, background): “Models of two-party competition (Calvert 1985; Banks et al. 2002; Banks & Duggan 2004 ) suggest that parties will converge to an electoral center in order to maximize their plurality over the opposition.”
- The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium (2007, unknown): “Previous formal analyses of the stochastic vote model (Banks and Duggan, 2005; McKelvey and Patty, 2006) have focused on conditions sufficient for the mean vector, z∗ = (x∗, . . . , x∗) to be a Nash equilibrium.”
- A Model of Farsighted Voting (2009, background): “Many authors have invoked the assumption of probabilistic b ehavior on the part of voters (see [16], [22], [1], and [10]), with the implication being that models of beh avior are incapable of perfectly predicting vote choice, and that this reality should be incorporated into th e calculations of vot”