Minos: Control Data Attack Prevention Orthogonal to Memory Model
By Jedidiah R. Crandall, Frederic T. Chong. Micro, 2004
379 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a0ac73ff5f861cf44495fb152a52e299c8d99723
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Dawn Song
- Engin Kirda
- Christopher Krügel
- David Brumley
- Heng Yin
- Ú. Erlingsson
- Paolo Milani Comparetti
- Prateek Saxena
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Engin Kirda
- Dawn Song
- Christopher Krügel
- Paolo Milani Comparetti
- David Brumley
- Miguel Oom Temudo de Castro
- Heng Yin
- Antony Ian Taylor Rowstron
In Signal Processing
- Engin Kirda
- Dawn Song
- Christopher Krügel
- David Brumley
- Paolo Milani Comparetti
- Heng Yin
- Pongsin Poosankam
- M. Kang
Citations in the corpus
- BitBlaze: A New Approach to Computer Security via Binary Analysis (2008, methodology): “For example, previous approaches either operate on a single process only [17,35,38], or they cannot deal with memory swapping and disks [16, 18].”
- Panorama: capturing system-wide information flow for malware detection and analysis (2007, background): “Many systems [26, 13, 28, 12, 35] detect exploits by tracking the data from untrusted sources such as the network being misused to alter the control flow.”
- Vigilante: end-to-end containment of internet worms (2005, methodology): “namic dataflow analysis [43, 11] perform well but they have not been implemented yet and they lack flexibility (for example, they cannot track the origin of dirty data to aid SCA generation).”
- Control-flow integrity principles, implementations, and applications (2009, background): “Clearly, this a crowded, important research area (e.g., [5, 7, 9, 12, 15, 22, 30, 33, 37, 39, 41, 46, 55, 56]).”
- Non-Control-Data Attacks Are Realistic Threats (2005, background): “…[9] and address-space randomization [4][6]; and others rely on control flow integrity for security, such as system call based intrusion detection techniques [17][18][19][21][22][23][34][47], control data protection techniques [10][35][42], and nonexecutable-memory-based protections [1][41].”
- LIFT: A Low-Overhead Practical Information Flow Tracking System for Detecting Security Attacks (2006, methodology): “Unlike previous hardware-based approaches [17, 36, 39] that require non-trivial hardware extensions, LIFT requires no hardware extension.”
- Prospex: Protocol Specification Extraction (2009, methodology): “By using dynamic taint analysis [22]–[24], we can precisely track how the application, which " understands " the messages and implements the protocol state machine, handles input data.”