Information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching

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The supply- and demand-side impacts of credit market information (2010, background): “…to see the data of others, and in general do not have problems sharing ‘negative’ information (on default), but sharing their own ‘positive’ information (on current lending) creates the possibility that their competitors will try to cherry-pick their own best clients (Gehrig and Stenbacka, 2007).”
Information Sharing and Credit: Firm-Level Evidence from Transition Countries (2009, background): “4 Bouckaert and Degryse (2004) and Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007) show that if banks compete ex ante for clients and customers face switching costs, future informational rents foster banking competition.”