What Is the Point of Equality?

By E. Anderson. 1999

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Two types of ‘enough’: sufficiency as minimum and maximum (2016, background): “…are located rather at the upper end, among them ideas to set the threshold at a level of enough money for people to be content (Frankfurt 1987), that enables one not to be oppressed by others and to function as an equal in society (Anderson 1999) or to develop central capabilities (Nussbaum 2011).”
Equality of Opportunity: Theory and Measurement (2016, background): “We mention the work of Scheffler (2003) and Anderson (1999), both of whom criticize what they call “luck egalitarianism” as too focused upon individual choice: to this they oppose a view of “democratic equality,” which involves treating all persons with equal dignity and respect.”
Equality of Opportunity (1998, background): “The debate is said to be about ‘equality of what,’ and the philosophical view is 23 sometimes called ‘luck egalitarianism,’ a term coined by Elizabeth Anderson (1999). 24 Economists (besides Sen) have been involved in this discussion from 1985 25 onwards. John Roemer (1993, 1998) proposed an algorit”
Resources versus Capabilities: Social Endowments in Egalitarian Theory (2007, background): “7 Elisabeth Anderson (1999) has coined the term ‘luck-egalitarians’ to denote those liberal-egalitarians who accept Dworkin’s claim that the distinction between choice and chance should be the cornerstone of egalitarian theorizing.”
Equality of When (2017, unknown): “27 See, for example, Anderson (1999).”
On the apparent conflict between individual and group fairness (2019, background): “Egalitarianism is the notion that people need to be treated in some senses equally, or that certain things need to be distributed according to some egalitarian principle [2, 13, 20, 42, 45, 51].”
Critical Perspectives on Governance Mechanisms for AI/ML Systems (2020, background): “…and to our mind most critically, Munro shares the concern of philosophers such as Mathias Risse, who observe the “minimal stan-dards” approach to much human rights discourse is insufﬁcient to account for positive values of both distributive and relational justice and equality (Anderson, 1999).”
This Thing Called Fairness (2019, methodology): “While this theory is not in conflict with Rawls’ justice as fairness [146], it has been critiqued by Anderson, who notes that the goal of political fairness should be ending socially imposed oppression, not eliminating the effects of “brute luck” [2].”